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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

WHAT, ME WORRY? THE MULTI-FRONT ASSAULT ON PRIVACY

ANDREW ASKLAND*
“Think, every day, something no one else is thinking. It is bad for the
mind to be always part of unanimity.” Christopher Morley 1
There is consistent polling evidence that Americans are concerned about
their privacy. 2 Although poll numbers fluctuate with current events, as
demonstrated in headlines about the U.S. PATRIOT Act, this underlying
pattern persists. 3 However, there is no clear or comprehensive vision of how

* Andrew Askland (J.D., Ph.D) is Director of the Center for the Study of Law, Science, &
Technology at the Arizona State University College of Law.
1. This often-cited quote is attributed to Christopher Morley, an American editor and author
living from 1890-1957. For sources attributing the quoted material to Christopher Morley, see,
Child Care Exchange, http://www.childcareexchange.com/eed/issue.php?id=377 (last visited Feb.
14, 2006); Pittsburg Area Brain Injury Alliance, http://www.pabia.org/Archives/Newsletters/
Cognitive%20Dissonance/cd_part_vii.htm (last visited Feb. 14, 2006); Quote Collection Website,
http://www.ptf.com/~vlb/Cuute/Quotes/quotes1.txt (last visited Feb. 14, 2006); Quotes by
Subject, http://www.ifla.org/faife/litter/subject/pluralism.htm (last visited Feb. 14, 2006).
2. For example, in the Harris Equifax, Health Information Privacy Survey, 75% of
respondents worried that medical records for a computerized national health information system
would be used for non-health purposes and 96% believed that federal legislation should designate
all personal medical information as “sensitive” and impose penalties for unauthorized disclosures.
Health Information Privacy Survey, HARRIS EQUIFAX 11-12 (1993). In the ACLU, Live and Let
Live poll in 1994, 75% of respondents were concerned a “great deal” or a “fair amount” that
health insurance companies are putting medical information about them into a computer
information bank that others have access to. Medical Privacy Public Opinion Polls,
http://www.epic.org/privacy/medical/polls.html (last visited Feb. 17, 2005). I do not propose that
we devise policy based solely upon polling data. These polls do not measure trade-offs between
privacy and other consumer preferences. They do not capture the choices that consumers make in
the real world. They usually do not explore the available solutions to the problems that they
identify, nor do they specify the legal and economic consequences of those solutions. Robert
Weissberg, Why Policymakers Should Ignore Public Opinion Polls, CATO POLICY ANALYSIS,
May 29, 2001, available at http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa402.pdf (last visited Oct. 5, 2005).
Despite these shortcomings, the polls do reveal a broadly shared concern about practices that
threaten privacy.
3. Others phrase the ebb and flow in grander historic terms. The late nineteenth century,
with the invention of the portable camera and the proliferation of sensational (so-called “yellow”)
journalism, is identified as one crest that spurred Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis to write
their famous law review article, The Right to Privacy, which supported the right, as Judge
Thomas Cooley articulated it, “to be left alone.” Richard M. Gellman, Can Privacy be Regulated
33
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to express the concern for privacy. We perceive that our privacy is
endangered, but we are not sure what to do about it. Some abuses focus our
attention and grounds demands for specific redress, such as periodic efforts to
regulate telemarketers.
However, these responses are haphazard and
disjointed. Part of the explanation likely lies in a disconnect among our
preferences; we claim that we oppose intrusions upon our privacy even as we
readily provide valuable personal information such as Social Security Numbers
to telemarketers who ask for them. 4 Perhaps we do not recognize the
relationship between filing applications for “free” Caribbean holidays and store
discount cards and the subsequent onslaught of spam emails, telephone
solicitations, junk surface mail, and sometimes, identity theft. More likely, we
want the benefits that are apparently offered and underestimate the costs that
are entailed. There is abundant evidence of people holding contradictory
preferences. For example, environmentalists sometimes drive gas-guzzling
automobiles, peace activists sometimes resort to violence, and some who are
devoutly religious limit their nominally universal vocation to fellow believers.
Similarly, we may have inconsistent views about privacy: we may want its
protections while we may also want the benefits that flow from practices that
undermine those protections.
Another part of the explanation for this disconnect between expressed
preferences and apparently contradictory practices is the expansive sweep of
the concept of privacy. This concept is cited in many contexts to support
varied policies and practices. We may perceive privacy violations in only
some of these policies and practices and our sensitivities may vary sharply
across the policies and practices. The preservation of intimacy in our relations
with others is a privacy interest. The accumulation and dissemination of
medical information (including genetic) impinges upon our privacy interests.
Access to our financial records affects our privacy interests. The generation of
a digital persona, created from data that is acquired, merged, and shared
through connecting computer networks, whether with or without our
complicity, evinces privacy concerns. The protection of our homes against

Effectively on a National Level? Thoughts on the Possible Need for International Privacy Rules,
41 VILL. L. REV. 129, 132-33 (1996). The computer revolution that rapidly accelerated in the
1960s stirred up another storm, resulting in various statutes addressing the informational privacy
that was threatened by the unprecedented advances in information technologies. Id. at 133.
According to the authors, the third wave is upon us, overdetermined by further IT developments
combined with the enhanced security measures devised and implemented to confront the threat of
international and domestic terrorism. Douglas J. Sylvester & Sharon Lohr, Counting on
Confidentiality: Legal and Statistical Approaches to Federal Privacy Law After the USA Patriot
Act, 2005 WISE. L. REV. 1033, 1033, 1036-38 (2005); Note, Up in Smoke: Online Privacy
Becomes the Latest Casualty in the War on Drugs, 27 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 169, 185 (2003).
4. See generally KEVIN D. MITNICK & WILLIAM L. SIMON, THE ART OF DECEPTION
(2002).
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physical intrusion and against physically non-intrusive surveillance invokes
our privacy interests. So too does the use of surveillance technology to
monitor our whereabouts in public places—either videotaping us or relying
upon transmitters to track our location. The right to choose to have an abortion
has been upheld as a privacy right. 5 We likely have differing intuitions about
the level of privacy protection that is appropriate for these and other privacy
situations.
Moreover, there does not seem to be a simple conception of privacy that
wholly underwrites these privacy policies and practices. There is likely a
“family resemblance” among the privacy interests, a la Wittgenstein’s
description of the relationship among games, 6 but thus far, there is no
consensus about a single definition that captures all of privacy’s ambit. Is it
control of information, 7 control of access to our person, 8 control over who can
sense us, 9 control over the intimacies of personal identity, 10 the protection of
human dignity, 11 the development of personal autonomy (whether as an end in
itself 12 or as promoting civil society 13), or some other definition that is at the
core of privacy concerns? This failure of a single, comprehensive definition is
hardly fatal and certainly not unique. Many familiar terms are similarly
inexact (indeed, they are often elastic) and nonetheless useful. 14 We are
dealing with an inexact term that will connote different meanings in different
contexts.
Yet another aspect of our current ambiguities about privacy is the lack of
historical precedent for many current challenges to privacy. The founders did
not have deeply held convictions about the threats to privacy that alarm us
because the technologies that ground those threats were in their infancy. Their
society was considerably simpler, in part, because it was not thoroughly
permeated by applied technologies. A right to privacy was not elaborately
articulated because privacy could be taken for granted. The sanctity of the
home and the security of personal papers and mailed correspondence were
5. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973) (“The right to privacy. . . as we feel it is . . .
is broad enough to encompass a woman’s decision whether or not to terminate her pregnancy.”).
6. Daniel J. Solove, Conceptualizing Privacy, 90 CAL. L. REV. 1088, 1097 (2002).
7. Charles Fried, Privacy, 77 YALE L.J. 475, 483 (1968).
8. Ruth Gavison, Privacy and the Limits of the Law, 89 YALE L.J. 421, 423 (1980).
9. Richard B. Parker, A Definition of Privacy, 27 RUTGERS L. REV. 275, 276 (1974).
10. JULIE C. INNESS, PRIVACY, INTIMACY, AND ISOLATION (1992); Tom Gerety, Redefining
Privacy, 12 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 233, 236 (1977).
11. Edward J. Bloustein, Privacy as an Aspect of Human Dignity: An Answer to Dean
Prosser, N.Y.U. L. REV. 962, 1002 (1964).
12. C. Keith Boone, Privacy and Community, 9 SOC. THEORY & PRAC. 1 (1983).
13. Julie E. Cohen, Examined Lives: Informational Privacy and the Subject as Object, STAN.
L. REV. 1373, 1426-28 (2000).
14. Paul F. Campos, Reflections on the Intersection of Law and Linguistics, WASH. U. L.Q.
971, 978 (1995).
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salient concerns, but the founders’ physicians and their medical records were
not tied to computer networks. Government and private enterprises did not
collect information about them on multiple accounts, nor was that information
easily accessible and collative. The founders were not available via telephone
or email to uninvited solicitors. A description of the differences between the
mores and practices of an 18th century decentralized, rural society and our
increasingly urban, centralized, and technology dependent society is worth
more attention than can be paid here. The point is that our constitutional
heritage does not directly address the privacy permutations that confront
contemporary society. 15 The variable issues of privacy protection that now
concern us have emerged from our unprecedented technologies. We cannot
expect to find specific guidance about how to resolve these difficulties in the
wisdom of writers who could not have imagined that our lives would
intertwine with technologies that both cushion and smother us.
Anita Allen has provided a useful typology in which privacy interests are
categorized according to their informational, physical, proprietary, and
decisional meanings. 16 These are helpful categories, but they are conventional
rather than essential. They might be misleading to the extent that they suggest
that the boundaries of the meanings are crisp and obvious or that they provide
doctrinal guidance with which to sanction or disallow particular privacy
claims. In contrast, hacker access to our personal computer files can involve
all four meanings. The physical invasion is slight, but nonetheless noticeable,
as even the slightest physical intrusion can have an impact disproportionate to
its material footprint. The compromise of proprietary information may be
significant if the data accessed without permission has commercial value. The
impact upon decisional liberty may be implicated if the files obtained include
research and writing that concerns personal decision-making.
These
interpretations are not strained because we increasingly rely upon our
computers for all-purpose business and personal processing, as well as storage
support. Likewise, we may suspect that our privacy interests are implicated in
situations that do not neatly fall within one of these meanings. For example, a
person might judge the extent to which privacy is threatened by the willingness
of others to surrender their own privacy, as the norm of what one can
reasonably expect to be protected is thereby diminished. 17 This is a broader
15. A strict constructionist view of the Constitution would limit its protection for privacy to
the enumerated instances, e.g., there can be no quartering of soldiers in private homes. Other
privacy abuses not mentioned, the Ninth Amendment notwithstanding, are then left for legislative
action. Carl T. Rowan, Equality as a Constitutional Concept, 47 MD. L. REV. 10, 12 (1987).
16. RICHARD C. TURKINGTON & ANITA L. ALLEN, PRIVACY LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS
25 (1999).
17. The Katz standard makes this acutely relevant. Courts are directed to protect actual
(subjective) expectations “that society is prepared to recognize as ‘reasonable.’” Katz v. United
States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring). If the expectation is not present, then
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concern than covered by any of the four specific meanings, but it clearly
should qualify as a legitimate privacy claim. 18
The United States has been reluctant to offer programmatic and systematic
protections to privacy, either by legislation, by judicial interpretation, or by
executive order. 19 Most European countries have attempted a systematic,
omnibus approach with a comprehensive set of national privacy laws (and
enforcement mechanisms such as an office of data protection). 20 Their
approach arises from a different consensus about the role of government
regulation of private enterprise. 21 Europe regards privacy as a personal right
that is nonproprietary in nature and shifts the burden of persuasion to those
whose practices affect privacy interests. 22 In Europe, privacy is a right; in
America, it is an economic commodity. 23 The United States prefers a laissez
faire view of the government’s relations with private enterprise. 24 The United
States does not presume that new practices violate privacy interests and
responds to individual problems only as they broach relevant thresholds of
public alarm. 25 One can phrase this response as pragmatic, a case-by-case
approach that respects the nuances of particular settings and parties. More
sharply, one can criticize the reponse as an ad hoc, hodge-podge reaction in
which sensationalized abuses are the focus of piecemeal legal intervention
even as a quiet accretion of incremental changes undermine important privacy
interests, sometimes with government endorsement.
“Oversight . . . is
decentralized. [Privacy] protection is not a core mission of any government
agency.” 26 There is no overarching view of a systemic problem because
privacy problems are regarded as discrete and isolated epiphenomena. 27

the reasonableness prong is likely moot. United States v. Meriwether, 917 F.2d 955, 959 (6th Cir.
1990).
18. This concern for reduced expectations of privacy leads to Anita Allen’s suggestion that
perhaps we should “force privacy” on people. Anita L. Allen, Coercing Privacy, WM. & MARY
L. REV. 723, 732-34 (1999).
19. Joel R. Reidenberg, Setting Standards for Fair Information Practice in the U.S. Private
Sector, 80 IOWA L. REV. 497, 500 (1995).
20. PRIVACIES: PHILOSOPHICAL EVALUATIONS 28 (2004).
21. Julia M. Fromholz, The European Union Data Privacy Directive, 15 BERKELEY TECH.
L.J. 461, 470 (2000).
22. GENETIC SECRETS: PROTECTING PRIVACY AND CONFIDENTIALITY IN THE GENETIC ERA
395 (1997).
23. Eric Dash, Europe Zips Lips; U.S. Sells Zips, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 17, 2005, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2005/08/07/weekinreview/07dash.html?ex=1128830400&en=d6c0d50b
ab23d734&ei=507 (last visited Oct. 16, 2005).
24. Lawrence Lessig, The Architecture of Privacy, 1 VAND. J. ENT. L. & PRAC. 56, 62
(1999).
25. Gellman, supra note 3, at 130, 134.
26. Dash, supra note 23.
27. Fromholz, supra note 21, at 471-72.
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I have already averred to the difficulty of identifying a single
comprehensive definition of privacy with which to engage the varying
practices that can be phrased as threats to privacy. I do not propose to proffer
yet another definition. However, I do propose to follow the example of Alan
Westin and suggest that we should look to the functions that privacy performs
as the best way to understand privacy and how we should devise means to
protect it from encroachments. 28 I shall first describe some of the challenges
that face privacy in our technology rich society. I will employ the four
categories articulated by Westin to order that presentation. Westin described
“basic states of individual privacy” 29 and, while I am not wedded to his
definition of these states, they nonetheless offer a useful means to parse the
various challenges to privacy that I will describe.
Westin’s four basic states are: solitude, intimacy, anonymity, and
reserve. 30 With solitude, “the individual is separated from the group and freed
from the observation of other persons.” 31 Westin acknowledged that various
other stimuli might affect the person in solitude. 32 This stimuli ranges from
physical stimuli, such as noise and odors, to psychological intrusions, like the
presence of God or one’s conscience. 33 Still, there is separation from others in
solitude that serves as a model of isolation. 34 With intimacy, the person is a
member of “a small unit that claims and is allowed to exercise corporate
seclusion so that it may achieve a close, relaxed, and frank relationship.” 35
The traditional husband–wife relationship is a clear instance, but work cliques
also qualify. 36 With anonymity, “the individual is in public places or
performing public acts but still seeks, and finds, freedom from identification
and surveillance.” 37 The individual “does not expect to be personally
identified and held to the full rules of behavior and roles that would operate if
he were known,” as the individual has merged into the “situational
landscape.” 38 Lastly, reserve is “the creation of a psychological barrier against
unwanted intrusion.” 39 This is what George Simmel called “reciprocal reserve
and indifference,” 40 a mental distance that protects personality and “is the
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
was the

ALAN F. WESTIN, PRIVACY AND FREEDOM 31 (1967).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
WESTIN, supra note 28.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 32.
WESTIN, supra note 28, at 32. Per Simmel, the intensification of nervous stimulation
gravest problem for the modern person. THE FIN DE SIECLE 62 (2000). The modern
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dynamic aspect of privacy in daily interpersonal relations.” 41 Reserve is the
most elusive of the four states, however, despite the difficulty of specifying a
definition, it is an important part of our functional expectations for privacy.
A.

Anonymity

This is a curious category of concern because its ubiquity is tied to modern
urbanization. In a rural setting, it is difficult to be anonymous, at least in one’s
own community, because everyone knows each other. Even in small towns,
though the degree of familiarity is less, most people are recognizable to each
other, while those who are not recognized stick out as different. The cities at
the time of our nation’s founding were large in comparison with the towns and
villages from which they evolved, however they did not approximate the
numbers that cities now total. 42 Furthermore, one was known within a sector
of the city. Cities by their size and function promote anonymity, but the
repetition of encounters within a neighborhood personalized the exchanges.43
Movement within these cities was not facilitated by mass transportation and
travel from one’s neighborhood to another was often regarded as risky
business. 44 In effect, technological limitations forced people to interact with
each other. 45 In addition, though migrants founded the country and periodic
migrations (recurrently west) mark its history, the stability of communities
persisted through these migrations. 46 Even though many people merely passed
through places, more people stayed. 47 The terms might be measured in years
or decades rather than generations, but these early urban neighborhoods
retained the characteristics and functions associated with small rural
communities. Thus, one would not be truly anonymous in a city of
neighborhoods, or at least the anonymity would be limited in scope.
Modernity changed the conditions of urban life. Technology enables us to
shake loose of a dependence upon a local support system. 48 The massive,
mobile, and independent populations of large cities make anonymity
unavoidable. One cannot take the time to make the acquaintance of everyone

struggles to preserve a subjective life against the overwhelming power of metropolitan forces. Id.
at 61.
41. WESTIN, supra note 28, at 32.
42. A POPULATION HISTORY OF NORTH AMERICA 1 (2000).
43. Jessica Bulman, Publishing Privacy: Intellectual Property, Self-Expression, and the
Victorian Novel, 26 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 73, 78 (2003).
44. HENRY WILLIAM ELSON, HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 290-92 (1905).
45. Bulman, supra note 43, at 78-79.
46. ROGER DANIELS, COMING TO AMERICA: A HISTORY OF IMMIGRATION AND ETHNICITY
IN AMERICAN LIFE 125 (2002).
47. Id.
48. B.J. FOGG, PERSUASIVE TECHNOLOGY: USING COMPUTERS TO CHANGE WHAT WE
THINK AND DO 8 (2003).
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that they encounter. Indeed, one cannot make eye contact with the
uncountable many that one faces each day, as exhaustion would result from too
many salutes, nods, and greetings. Instead, one melts into the flow of bustling
humanity individually purposeful, observing norms of efficiency and
politeness, but otherwise disinterested. We suspend the demands of social
interaction that would otherwise slow and confuse us.
Although there are limits to this sanctioned lack of regard for each other,
within them we are allowed to act as though we are invisible. 49 We are located
in public space and can call attention to ourselves by violating the governing
norms of conduct—like, for example, if we sing a popular tune too loudly or
bustle too aggressively. Nevertheless, the norms allow a tremendous degree of
unencumbered actions without accountability. Surely, we surrender something
that is important by distancing from others and we would not want this
distancing to define our social lives. On the other hand, if we must submit to
the pace and indifference of a massively populous circumstance, we should be
allowed the benefits of its apparently boundless scale and blissful
obliviousness.
This increasing anonymity in urban places coincides with the rise of
individualism, both as creed and practice. 50 Anonymity serves to reinforce
norms that promote individualism. 51 For example, you can read more daringly
if you can acquire reading material anonymously. 52 The strictures of a small,
parochial place might dissuade its denizens against exploratory reading,
especially if the unfamiliar reading material were regarded as risqué or
threatening. Associations, too, are more freely developed in the anonymity of
a large place. 53 One can test the attractions of new ideas and different people
more readily where one need not justify the dalliance to family and
acquaintances.
This license to explore anonymously is not without
shortcomings, as not only positive self-expression is empowered.
Pornography, for example, is consumed in greater quantities when it can be
49. The contrast of orientation between personal relations in a rural setting and impersonal
relations in an urban setting has been cited as a ground for the difference between shame and guilt
as a basis for morality. See generally BERNARD WILLIAMS, SHAME AND NECESSITY (1993).
50. Ann M. Lucas, Race, Class, Gender, and Deviancy: The Criminalization of Prostitution,
10 BERKELEY WOMEN’S L.J. 47, 52 (1995).
51. Id.
52. Ready access to a patron’s borrowing record at a library threatens that patron’s
independence. The PATRIOT Act includes a provision granting access to a patron’s records and
that provision is strongly resisted and resented by professional library associations. Kathryn
Martin, The USA Patriot Act’s Application to Library Patron Records, 29 J. LEGIS 283, 290
(2003). It is noteworthy that the publication of a record of the videotapes rented by a prominent
judicial nominee led to federal legislation protecting video rental records. Jonathan Zittrain, What
the Publisher Can Teach the Patient: Intellectual Property and Privacy in an Era of Trusted
Privication, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1201, 1234 (2000).
53. W. MICHAEL REISMAN, LAW IN BRIEF ENCOUNTERS 3 (1999).
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accessed anonymously, as witnessed by the proliferation of pornography on the
Internet. 54 Anonymity enables a kind of schizophrenia in which the life that
one displays to the public may be wholly unlike the life that one lives
undetected by others. 55 The contrasting uses of anonymity are yet another
instance of the burden of personal freedom. The fact that we are free to choose
for ourselves does not assure that we will choose wisely or well. We are trying
both to assure personal freedom and to promote its responsible exercise, but we
cannot assure the latter without compromising the former.
Technological advances are redefining the terms of urban anonymity. 56
Camera surveillance is a primary vector for this redefinition. 57 The
proposition to video-monitor public streets was initially concentrated on lowend criminal activity. 58 If police officers could not be present at all times on
streets where drug distribution or prostitution were rampant, camera
surveillance could serve as substitutes, taping the illegal activities and
empowering later arrests and prosecutions. 59 Equipment costs have declined
and surveillance is budgeted for implementation in an increasing number of
locations. 60 Public alarm about the threat of terrorism has fueled the expanded
use of surveillance technologies, especially in the aftermath of the airline
suicide attacks of September 11, 2001, and the 2005 subway bombing episodes
in London (with the video tapes of the perpetrators). 61 Public transportation
depots are being outfitted with elaborate camera systems to support both active
surveillance and ex post facto analysis of taped events. 62 It is unlikely that
surveillance systems, once installed, will be dismantled.

54. PAMELA PAUL, PORNIFIED: HOW PORNOGRAPHY IS TRANSFORMING OUR LIVES, OUR
RELATIONSHIPS, AND OUR FAMILIES 49 (2005).
55. This control of information to deceive others defines the core use of privacy. Richard A.
Posner, The Right of Privacy, 12 GA. L. REV. 393 (1978). He regards privacy protection as the
means by which one hides information from others in order to manipulate or otherwise take
advantage of them. “Very few people want to be let alone. They want to manipulate the world
around them by selective disclosure of facts about themselves . . . .” Id. at 400-01.
56. TECHNOLOGY AND PRIVACY: THE NEW LANDSCAPE 10-12 (1997).
57. Electronic Privacy Information Center, Spotlight on Surveillance: More Cities Deploy
Camera Surveillance Systems with Federal Grant Money, available at www.epic.org/privacy/
surveillance/spotlight/0505.html (last visited Feb. 16, 2006).
58. REG WHITAKER, THE END OF PRIVACY 81 (1999).
59. See DAVID D. BRIN, THE TRANSPARENT SOCIETY: WILL TECHNOLOGY FORCE US TO
CHOOSE BETWEEN PRIVACY AND FREEDOM 5 (1998).
60. Martha T. Moore, Cities Opening More Video Surveillance Eyes, USA TODAY, July 18,
2005, available at http://usatoday.printthis.clickability.com (last visited Feb. 14, 2006).
61. Alice Lipowicz, London Bombings Sound Security Alarm, WASH. TECH,
www.washingtontechnology.com/news/20_14/cover-stories/26592-1.html (last visited Feb. 16,
2006).
62. Lindsay Isaacs, Transit Surveillance: Wrecks, Lies, and Videotape, AM. CITY &
COUNTY, Jan. 1, 2003, at 20.
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Shopping malls have replaced stores fronting on public streets as the
standard setting for retail shopping, largely because private ownership of the
property surrounding shops provides the owners with considerably greater
control over invitees who enter the property. 63 First Amendment rights are not
protected on private property to the same extent as in public places. 64 In
addition, many actions, such as unsanctioned solicitations and loitering, are
more easily controlled on private property. 65 Control is the key consideration,
and surveillance cameras are a logical extension of the control that mall
owners already exercise. Many private security officers are charged to patrol
shopping malls and can monitor a higher number of places more efficiently
with a network of surveillance cameras. 66 For this reason, in a shopping mall
one should presume that cameras are watching, as there is no longer anonymity
in that quasi-public space.
The task is monitoring shopper activities. Surveillance of shopper
movements with cameras is one approach, but there are other monitoring
options. We shall not soon reach the extremes of the movie Minority Report,
in which scanners recognized an identity imprint on each person’s eyes and
entreated that person by name to buy goods in the shops they were passing. 67
The scanners likely knew each person’s purchasing history and framed their
entreaties accordingly. Instead, Radio Frequency Identifications (“RFIDs”)
placed on merchandise will enable scanners to read the tags from a few feet
away. 68 RFIDs are an important commercial development because they will
help deter shoplifting and will facilitate inventory control. 69 If the tag is
removed when a sale occurs, then there is no further communication between
the tag and the readers. 70 If the tag is disabled rather than removed, other
readers can still read the tag (and track the movement of the merchandise to
which it is attached) if the disabling is reversible. 71 Indeed, consumers may be
attracted to reactivated tags to catalogue their belongings and to assist in
recovery if they are stolen.
63. PACO UNDERHILL, CALL OF THE MALL 32-33 (2004).
64. Dahlia Lithwick, Why Can Shopping Malls Limit Free Speech, SLATE,
http://www.slate.com/id/2079885/ (last visited Feb. 14, 2006).
65. See Elizabeth E. Joh, Conceptualizing the Private Police, 2005 UTAH L. REV. 573, 594
(2005).
66. See id. at 588-90.
67. See MINORITY REPORT (Twentieth Century Fox 2002).
68. Gal Eschet, FIPs And PETs For RFID: Protecting Privacy In the Web of Radio
Frequency Identification, 45 JURIMETRICS J. 301, 302 (2005).
69. Id. at 302; Catherine Yang, The State of Surveillance, BUS. WK., Aug. 8, 2005, at 54
(2005).
70. Oleg Kobelev, Big Brother on a Tiny Chip: Ushering in the Age of Global Surveillance
Through the Use of Radio Frequency Identification Technology and the Need for Legislative
Response, 6 N.C. J.L. & TECH. 325, 328 (2005).
71. See id.
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RFID sensing technology was initially developed for aircraft in World War
II to identify and distinguish friend from foe. 72 It was later employed with
other military equipment and then with cattle and railroad cars. 73 Today, a tire
company embeds tags in its tires. 74 Technological improvements and
economies of scale are projected to reduce costs per application from dimes
and quarters to pennies and make RFIDs a viable technology for retail
merchandise. 75 Rather than being attached after manufacture, RFIDs will be
integrated into merchandise during the manufacturing process. 76 The tags will
be a less obtrusive, permanent part of the product. 77 It may even become
impossible to determine if a product contains an RFID. The tags provide the
means to track the merchandise (and anyone wearing the merchandise) via a
network of readers. 78 Prisons, hospitals, and elementary schools have
legitimate reasons to monitor their wards, and tagged clothing would assist that
tracking. Similarly, other industries might be concerned with tracking the
whereabouts of the employees or guests of their facilities at all times.
Otherwise, we may be alarmed by a technology that compiles a record—an
electronic trail—in remarkable detail of our everyday activities, limited only
by the placement of online readers.
RFIDs can be active, but are less expensive when passive. 79 When active,
RFIDs have an on-tag power source and an active transmitter. 80 When
passive, they are without either a power source or a transmitter. 81 Passive
RFIDs do not emit a signal, but present themselves to be read by scanners. 82
The advantage they provide to merchandisers and to the monitoring of
prisoners, minors, and patients will hasten their widespread adoption. 83 RFIDs
will be present in an increasingly large amount of the clothing that we wear
and will provide the means to generate a chronology of the daily location of
anyone conventionally clothed. 84 Profligate use will undermine informational

72. Eschet, supra note 68, at 307.
73. Kobelev, supra note 70, at 328.
74. ANN CAVOUKAIN, TAG YOU’RE IT: PRIVACY IMPLICATIONS OF RADIO FREQUENCY
IDENTIFICATION (RFID) TECHNOLOGY 12 (2004).
75. Declan McCullagh, RFID Tags: Big Brother in Small Packages, CNET news.com,
http://news.com.com/2102-1069_3-980325.html?tag=st.util.print (last visited Feb. 14, 2006).
76. Kobelev, supra note 70, at 329
77. CAVOUKAIN, supra note 74, at 9.
78. Id. at 7.
79. Id. at 5.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 6.
83. Kobelev, supra note 70, at 326.
WK.
84. Jane
Black,
Playing
Tag
with
Shoppers’
Anonymity,
BUS.
http://www.businessweek.com/technology/content/jul2003/tc20030721_8408_tc073.htm?campai
gn_id=search (last visited Feb. 14, 2006).
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self-determination, which will affect our autonomy and anonymity. 85 Credit
card records already provide a kind of biography of each cardholder, limited in
scope to those aspects of the person that are captured by expenditures. RFIDs
will provide a more ambitious biography, chronicling our daily activities. 86
Because we must affirmatively manage our acquisition of tagged goods to
avoid its coverage, it will rob us of default anonymity in location and
movement.
The widespread use and acceptance of RFIDs is anticipated by the
proliferation of Global Position System (“GPS”) devices in automobiles and
cell phones. 87 In both cases, the initial motivation to make GPS devices
standard equipment was safety enhancement. 88 In many emergency situations,
people in distress had the means to call for help, but were unable to provide
information about their location. 89 Similarly, trucks laden with goods can be
tracked with GPS technology so that their locations can always be identified. 90
The transportation of goods can be managed more efficiently when their
locations can be easily determined. The technology has two effects: it permits
the GPS user to determine their own location and allows others to determine
the location of the GPS user. 91 The on-going monitoring of location permits
the monitoring of speed. 92 One car rental agency attempted to charge penalty
fees to its customers for each instance that the vehicle exceeded the posted
speed limit. 93 Regardless of the initial motivation, GPS technology provides a
reliable and accurate means to track and record the location of transmitters
assigned to a cell phone or an automobile. The automobile is ubiquitous in
American life and the cell phone is insinuating itself rapidly, especially among
today’s youth. In each case, we are making ourselves traceable by anyone who
gains access to the GPS. These technological conveniences may betray us by
making our past and current locations an open record.

85. See JAY STANLEY & BARRY STEINHARDT, ACLU REPORT, BIGGER MONSTER WEAKER
CHAINS: THE GROWTH OF AMERICAN SURVEILLANCE SOCIETY 7 (Jan. 2003), available at
http://www.aclu.org/FilesPDFs/aclu_report_bigger_monster_weaker_chains.pdf.
86. CAVOUKIAN, supra note 74, at 1.
87. GPS originated in the 1960s as a means to enable submarines to identify their location
away from shore. Lee Gomes, Military’s Use of GPS, a Civilian Mainstay, Is at Core of Its
Might, WALL ST. J., Mar. 24, 2003, at B1. A system of orbiting satellites provides real-time
location coordinates using triangulation techniques. Id.
88. Carolyn Said & Carrie Kirby, GPS Cell Phone May Cost Privacy, SAN FRANCISCO
CHRON., Mar. 19, 2001, at C4.
89. Peter Loftus, In Case of Emergency . . . Dial 911 and the Police Will Know Where You
Are; At Least That’s the Theory, WALL ST. J., Sept. 23, 2002, at R12.
90. WHITAKER, supra note 58, at 87.
91. CHRISTIAN PARENTI, THE SOFT CAGE 2, 4 (2003).
92. RICHARD HUNTER, WORLD WITHOUT SECRETS 55 (2002).
93. Id.
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RFIDs and GPS are high-technology tracking systems. Comparatively
simpler tracking systems already compile records of credit card use, website
visits, grocery and prescription purchases, driving license data, and scores of
other important information about us. 94 Computer systems used to be opaque
and discrete, as data collected by one system was unavailable to another. 95
The practical effects of Moore’s Law 96 are a tremendous growth in capacity
and a dramatic reduction in storage costs. 97 Connectivity problems between
databanks have proven largely surmountable, and, coupled with programming
innovations, data collection and manipulation are inexpensive and pervasive. 98
These advances have enabled companies like ChoicePoint, Acxiom, and
LexisNexis to connect multiple databanks and create intricate dossiers of
information about almost anyone. 99 Originally, the motivation for the
companies was the profits available for the commercial applications of collated
and cross-referenced data. 100 These companies could sell lists of ingeniously
collated information to buyers who might, for example, have a reason to
selectively market to individuals who recently registered a late model luxury
automobile and spend in excess of $1,500.00 each year on air transportation. 101
These uses are alarming, but after September 11, 2001, ambitions for the use of
information greatly expanded. 102 The federal government had separated the
data systems of its various agencies and programs from each other as a matter
of law and policy. 103 There were legitimate concerns about the centralization
of power in government hands and that concern encompassed the power of
information. 104 Post 9/11, our priorities shifted. The largest data warehouse
companies offered to share their information databases with the federal
government. 105 The motives were both patriotic (to assist in the location of
terrorists and bolster the country’s defenses) and economic. 106 Although
programs like Total Information Awareness (“TIA”) Program suggest that the

94. DAVID BURNHAM, THE RISE OF THE COMPUTER STATE 7-8 (1988).
95. See id. at 11-12.
96. Gordon Moore predicted in 1965 that the number of transistors per integrated circuit
would double every year. ROBERT O’HARROW JR., NO PLACE TO HIDE 42 (2005). The pace has
slowed somewhat in recent years, but growth remains exponential. Id.
97. Id. at 42-43.
98. See generally id. at 39-41.
99. See id. at 39-40.
100. SIMSON GARFINKEL, DATABASE NATION: THE DEATH OF PRIVACY IN THE 21ST
CENTURY 11 (2000).
101. See id. at 158.
102. STANLEY & STEINHARDT, supra note 85, at 1.
103. The Computer Matching and Privacy Protection Act of 1988, 5 U.S.C. 552a(o) (1999).
104. JEFFREY ROSEN, THE NAKED CROWD: RECLAIMING SECURITY AND FREEDOM IN AN
ANXIOUS AGE 150-51 (2004).
105. O’HARROW, supra note 96, at 56-57.
106. Id. at 56-58.
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federal government wants to compile information databases itself, 107 if the
government is unable to do so, they can instead contract with private industry
for the information services that it needs. 108 The coordination of data derived
from the simplest exchange in the smallest system is now subsumed in the
maw of the data warehouse giants and, through them, the federal
government. 109
B.

Personal Intimacy

Medical records provide an appropriate segue from anonymity to personal
intimacy. The medical profession promotes an ideal physician–patient
relationship in which the patient unhesitatingly confides in the physician. 110
The physician–patient privilege is built upon this model, which “enables a
patient to secure medical attention without fear of betrayal and unwarranted
embarrassing and detrimental disclosure in court of information which might
deter him from revealing his symptoms to a doctor to the detriment of his
health.” 111 However, the model is built upon a notional relationship that has
proven problematic. 112 In practice, the relationship may not have been as
fiduciary as it was described in theory, and it may have been objectionably
paternalistic. 113 With changes in the marketing of medical services, many
patients now insist upon an active role in their diagnosis and treatment. 114 The
idealization and evolution of the relationship is a complex subject beyond the
reach of this paper. What is relevant is a two-step attack on the privacy that
grounds that relationship. The first step is concerned with advances in
genomics that enable personalized medicine. The second step is concerned
with managed health care and computerized medical records. Both directly
undermine the intimacy of the patient-physician relationship and diminish
expectations of anonymity.

107. See generally GINA MARIE STEVENS, REPORT FOR CONGRESS: PRIVACY: TOTAL
INFORMATION AWARENESS PROGRAMS AND RELATED INFORMATION ACCESS, COLLECTION,
AND PROTECTION LAWS, available at http://www.fas.org/irp/crs/RL31730.pdf (last visited Feb.
16, 2006) (describing the Total Information Awareness (TIA) Programs of the Department of
Defense).
108. Bradley Graham, Poindexter Resigns But Defends Programs: Anti-Terrorism, Data
Scanning Efforts at Pentagon Called Victims of Ignorance, WASH. POST, Aug. 13, 2003, at A2.
109. See ROSEN, supra note 104, at 150-51.
110. HOWARD BRODY, THE HEALER’S POWER 60-61 (2002).
111. Stempler v. Speidell, 495 A.2d 857, 860 (N.J. 1985) (quoting State in Interest of M.P.C.,
397 A.2d 1092, 1095 (N.J Super. Ct. App. Div. (1979)).
112. KEN COX, DOCTOR AND PATIENT: EXPLORING CRITICAL THINKING 69 (2000).
113. ALBERT R. JONSEN, THE NEW MEDICINE AND THE OLD ETHICS 97 (1990).
114. Ezekiel J. Emanuel & Linda L. Emanuel, Four Models of the Physician-Patient
Relationship, 267 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 2221, 2223 (1992).
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Though humans are genetically identical to a remarkable extent
(99.9%), 115 given that the human genome contains approximately 3 billion
base pairs of DNA, there are some three million genetic differences between
almost any two individuals. 116 Thus, we are as crucially different as we are
incredibly alike. 117 The differences underwrite toxicogenomics, the study of
gene expression in response to toxic exposure, 118 and toxicogenetics, the study
of genetic variations that affect susceptibility to toxins. 119 Given the pace of
current studies, soon we shall be able to predict which particular individuals
are more likely than the general population to contract illnesses (or otherwise
compromise their health) on account of their particular polymorphisms, genetic
variations, and known, identifiable conditions in specific environments. 120
Given an ability to identify susceptible individuals (at least for some
illnesses), we can anticipate that concerned parties, such as employers, will
adopt screening procedures to preempt the exposure of susceptible individuals
to the triggering toxin. 121 The screening procedures may be adopted as a
condition for employment. 122 If an applicant tests positive for the relevant
polymorphisms, he or she will be ineligible for employment. 123 The ground
for the ineligibility is the identified health risk. 124 The employer is making a
judgment on behalf of the applicant about his or her susceptibility to the health
risk and also making a judgment about their own potential tort liability to
compensate that person if, or when, the illness arises. 125 In response, a
comparable temptation to intervene on behalf of employees will likely arise
among legislators and regulators.

115. Gary E. Marchant, Genomics and Toxic Substances: Part II–Genetic Susceptibility to
Environmental Agents, 33 ENVTL. L. REP. 10641 (2003).
116. George Orphanides & Ian Kimber, Toxicogenetics: Applications and Opportunities, 75
TOXICOLOGICAL SCI. 1 (2003).
117. Jonathan Weems, Commentary, A Proposal for a Federal Genetic Privacy Act, 24 J.
LEGAL MED. 109, 111 (2003).
118. Polymorphism affecting susceptibility generally involves both the oxidation stage of
metabolism, in which foreign substances are oxidized to form high-energy reactive intermediates,
and the conjugation stage, in which the reactive metabolite forms a non-reactive, water-soluble
molecule that can be secreted by the body. Marchant, supra note 115, at 10642. The greatest
risks arise from exposure to toxins that produce a rapid variant for the oxidation stage gene and a
slow variant for the applicable conjugation stage gene. Id. at 10643.
119. Id. at 10071.
120. Lynn L. Bergeson et al., Toxicogenomics, ENVTL. FORUM, Nov.-Dec. 2002, at 28, 31.
121. Jennifer R. Taylor, Mixing the Gene Pool and the Labor Pool: Protecting Workers from
Genetic Discrimination in Employment, 20 TEMP. ENVTL. L. & TECH. J. 51, 57 (2001).
122. ELLEN ALDERMAN & CAROLINE KENNEDY, THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY 275-76 (1995).
123. Taylor, supra note 121, at 55.
124. Id. at 57.
125. Katherine Brokaw, Comment, Genetic Screening in the Workplace and Employer’s
Liability, 23 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 317, 326 (1990).
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This is an example of how knowledge of the human genome is going to
affect health care before the onset of symptoms. Knowledge of an individual’s
genome will permit the personalization of medical care. 126 Rather than
adopting treatment plans according to their probability of success in the
general population, physicians will devise treatment plans that respond to the
particular genome of each patient. 127 The identification of these “susceptibility
genes” can encourage a reductionist-view of human capacity. Despite the
caution that most susceptibility genes are probabilistic and express themselves
differently according to varying environmental conditions, the qualifications
can get lost in the translation to popular understanding and commercial
application. 128 Susceptibility may be mistakenly viewed as certainty and
market forces may drive employers and insurers to discriminate based on
Although there is legislation prohibiting this
genetic constitution. 129
discrimination, 130 such legislation will likely prove futile as genetic testing
becomes a regular part of medical care and gene test reports become a routine
feature of medical folders. 131 As physicians inform their decisions about
treatment options with the relationships between medication efficacy and
genetic polymorphisms, genetic profiles will be decipherable from the
treatments pursued in individual cases. Even without a genetic record, a
knowledgeable reviewer will be able to extrapolate some genetic
polymorphisms from a treatment record.

126. Josh Fischman, On Target: A New Generation of Drugs Offers Customized Cures, U.S.
NEWS & WORLD REP., Jan. 20, 2003, at 52.
127. That aspect highlights the individualizing impact of the genetic revolution. A second
aspect is the need for data from maximally many people. In order to generate the database of
susceptibility genes that will empower individualized medicine, research requires cooperation of
many volunteers who will permit access to their genome. It is possible to accumulate this data
and treat the volunteers with respect. Only a few decades ago, researchers often ignored their
obligations to their subjects, but current practices are improved by protocols that stress the
informed consent of subjects. Funding sources that support genetic research are insisting upon
the implementation of these protocols. Even when conducted with respect for its subjects, the
scope of the research is population wide. It seeks to generalize from genetic facts and individual
peculiarities are washed out in these conclusions.
128. Jamie A. Grodsky, Genetics and Environmental Law: Redefining Public Health, 93 CAL.
L. REV. 174, 213 (2005).
129. George J. Annas, Genetic Privacy: There Ought to Be a Law, 4 TEX. L. REV. 9, 12
(1999); Richard R. Sharp & J. Carl Barrett, The Environmental Genome Project and Bioethics, 9
KENNEDY INST. ETHICS J. 175, 182 (1999).
130. New Jersey, for example, provides a broadly phrased protection against discriminatory
uses of genetic information. Genetic Privacy Act, N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 10:5-43-10:5-49 (West
2002).
131. Scott Burris & Lawrence O. Gostin, Genetic Screening from a Public Health
Perspective: Some Lessons from the HIV Experience, in GENETIC SECRETS: PROTECTING
PRIVACY AND CONFIDENTIALITY IN THE GENETIC ERA 137, 150-51 (Mark A. Rothstein ed.,
1997).
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The increasing sophistication of insured citizens, as well as the ease of
access to and reduced costs of genetic testing will precipitate changes in
current laws and regulations limiting employer/insurer access to, and use of,
genetic tests. As individuals with susceptibility genes marking the certainty of
a later disease test themselves and over-insure against the later disease,
insurance companies will petition for the authority to test for those diseases to
protect their basic commercial premise—dividing costs of coverage among
claimants with comparable probabilities of risk. Without that change, insurers
will be victimized by adverse selection, as those seeking insurance will know
more about the probability of future disease than the insurers and will overinsure, while those who do not anticipate gene-related illness will under-insure.
Within these strategies, there is a tendancy to bleed away the contingencies
of each person’s life choices and instead focus on a genetic profile. The tilt
toward genetic reductionism will erode patient confidence in their physicians,
who will be expected to order genetic testing because it will be indicated by
the governing standard of care. Genetic test results will be available to
whomever the physician is obligated to provide them, which means that health
insurance companies will able to acquire and trade the reports. 132 Insurance
companies will have legitimate grounds to acquire and analyze the reports and
they will not be able to resist the temptation to expand their use to purposes
that do not benefit the patient. The use of medical/genetic records will
undermine the confidential relationship that is critically important for accurate
and effective health care. If physicians are the point of contact for a network
that gathers genetic information about the patient and imposes burdens or
otherwise disadvantages the patient, the patient will regard the physician as
primarily loyal to the network and its priorities.
In addition, patients will not be able to maintain control of their genomes.
Rather, the data will be accessible to whoever is authorized to access it. The
authorization protocols will likely be managed by the health insurance
company rather than the patient. 133 A condition of coverage will likely be the
grant of permission to the insurance company to access and use the data.
Gradual “mission creep” will lead to use of the data for scientific research,
perhaps broadly construed, and other purposes not directly benefiting the
patient such as cost containment. Laws and regulations will aim to preserve a
degree of anonymity for the patient’s records, but the control valve, however
constrained, will be held by insurers. Anonymity will be protected, or not, as it
comports with the priorities of the insurer. Even if the insurer adopts policies
and practices to protect patient anonymity, it is difficult to assure that the data

132. Robert M. Gellman, Prescribing Privacy: The Uncertain Role of the Physician in the
Protection of Patient Privacy, 62 N.C. L. REV. 255, 259-60 (1984).
133. See generally Lawrence O. Gostin, Health Information Privacy, 80 CORNELL L. REV.
451 (1995).
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will not be accessed illegally. It is also difficult to assure that those who
manage the data system will possess the attitude and commitment that the
insurer presumes will guide their performance. Public choice theory suggests
that they will not. 134 Effective anonymity then depends upon managing a
chain of employees acting to further their own private or vested interests.
Health care is managed by corporations focused on economies of scale and
wide-ranging standardized procedures. 135 Care is individualized to the degree
that each patient’s unique characteristics permit a more accurate diagnosis. 136
Each patient is also reduced to the sum of those characteristics and the treating
physician is answerable to the relevant health insurer for care that deviates
from the prescribed standard. 137 There is a deep irony in this juxtaposition of
improved diagnostics enabled by genetic research and a diminished confidence
in the physicians informed by these improvements because their patients have
been reduced to the sum of their biomarkers. It may be that treatment
improves at the cost of reduced confidence in the treatment providers.
The cost pressures of health care have already undermined patient
confidence in treatment aside from genetic developments. 138 The model of a
physician with a personal relationship with each of her patients may have
always been unachievable in practice, but it served aspirational purposes. 139
The adoption of managed health care practices has largely subverted that
aspiration. 140 Most patients have severely limited contact with the doctors who
treat them. 141 The health care industry relies heavily upon underpaid and
under-trained staff and overtaxed nurses to contain costs. 142 There are too few
opportunities for patients to connect with their caregivers as fellow human
beings, open to each other’s unique qualities and experiences. 143
134. See generally JAMES M. BUCHANAN & GORDON TULLOCK, THE CALCULUS OF
CONSENT: LOGICAL FOUNDATIONS OF CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY (1962); RUSSELL
HARDIN, COLLECTIVE ACTION (1982).
135. Paul M. Schwartz, Privacy and the Economics of Personal Health Care Information, 76
TEX. L. REV. 1, 12-13 (1997).
136. Mark A. Rothstein & Phyllis Griffin Epps, Ethicial and Legal Implications of
Pharmacogenomics, 2 NATURE REV. GENETICS 228, 230 (2001).
137. E. HAAVI MORREIM, BALANCING ACT: THE NEW MEDICAL ETHICS OF MEDICINE’S
NEW ECONOMICS 54-55 (1991).
138. See Shirley Eiko Sanematsu, Comment, Taking a Broader View of Treatment Disputes
Beyond Managed Care: Are Recent Legislative Efforts the Cure?, 48 UCLA L. REV. 1245, 1250
(2001).
139. See generally BRODY, supra note 110, at 60 (discussing the ideal physician-patient
relationship).
140. WILLIAM F. MAY, THE PHYSICIAN’S COVENANT 187 (1983).
141. ARTHUR KLEINMAN, THE ILLNESS NARRATIVES: SUFFERING, HEALING, AND THE
HUMAN CONDITION 263 (1988).
142. Id.
143. See generally BRODY, supra note 110, at 60 (discussing the importance of the human
relationship in conjunction with medicine).
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Considerations of efficiency often promote an indifference to the basic
requirements of care-giving that nurture interpersonal bonding. 144 There is
already a reduced amount of patient confidence available to confront the new
challenges to genetic knowledge. 145
Although the focus is primarily upon technology-based threats to privacy,
it is useful to briefly acknowledge other threats to intimacy that arise from
lifestyle choices. These choices affect many of the relationships traditionally
regarded as intimate. As we reconfigure those relationships and squeeze
intimacy out of them, we diminish their privacy content and impact. The
mobility of the modern nuclear family stretches the support of extended family
that fosters intimate relations. 146 There are sound evolutionary reasons for
expanding a circle of concern to include more than the immediate family. A
larger circle of kin relations provides more opportunities for intimate
connection and protects against breaks in core family relationships. 147 The
extended network provides reinforcement and resiliency. 148 With a peripatetic
life, one is thrown back on the core family with each change of location.
Efforts to supplant kin relations with networks of friends can strain under the
pressure of short durations and frequent turnover. Households with two
working spouses or only one parent are routine, and it can be difficult for these
parents to devote adequate time and energy to their children. These stresses
are better reported elsewhere, but nonetheless contribute to the general
diminishment of intimacy within families.
The influence of the mass media (television, the music and motion picture
industries, videogames, iPods and other pocket sized ultra light audio players,
the Internet, etc.) is relevant, in part, because their combined impact is not
outweighed by contrasting values inculcated during extensive familial
activities. 149 There may not be enough family events to constitute an effective
counterweight. 150 School is expected to provide skills and attitudes that were

144. See KLEINMAN, supra note 141, at 265.
145. See Sanematsu, supra note 138, at 1250.
146. See generally BERNARD WONG, FAMILY, KIN, AND COMMUNITY (2001).
147. See ROGER M. KEESING, KIN GROUPS AND SOCIAL STRUCTURE 8 (1975).
148. Interestingly, the challenge of the nation-state is to expand that circle of concern broadly
enough to encompass fellow citizens, though likely at a less demanding level than required by kin
relations. One might view the complaint against western culture lodged by the less developed
countries, particularly by religious fundamentalists in those countries, as that it disdains
traditional values as a recognition that the west has succeeded in creating a nation-state ethos, but
surrendered part of its family-oriented heritage en route.
149. See generally, LAWRENCE GROSSBERG ET AL., MEDIAMAKING: MASS MEDIA IN A
POPULAR CULTURE 258-59 (1998).
150. JAN. E. DIZARD & HOWARD GADLIN, THE MINIMAL FAMILY 6-9 (1990).

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

52

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY PUBLIC LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 25:33

once the province of the family. 151 Increased reliance upon organized sports
and other organized activities deserves mention as well. They provide
alternative sources of norms and intimacy, which, on balance, contribute to a
child’s development, but they may also supplant the core intimacy of the
family. 152 The result of the reduction in the amount and quality of time shared
with family members is that many children are influenced less by their parents
than by the mass media and by their school and extracurricular experiences. 153
Another consideration bears mention. A criticism of past privacy practices
is that abuses within the family were shielded from detection by conventions
that forbade or hindered outside interference as violating the sanctity of the
family. 154 This is the crux of the feminist complaint, which points out that
much of the subjugation of women occurred in households and that the
political impact of the subjugation was ignored by tunnel vision apologies for
family insularity. 155 The family should not be a free-fire zone for sexual,
physical, or psychological abuse, and victims should be encouraged to
recognize and report the abuse. We want to empower victims to see beyond
the confines of their particular family’s practices. 156 On the other hand, we do
not want family members to presume that their family is objectionably
dysfunctional. Efforts to identify abuse and intervene can be overly zealous
and interfere with families whose practices are not abusive, but instead are
different. Some abuse is readily identifiable, but other purported abuse may
not be easily ascertained. Is corporal punishment always abuse? Is martinet
parenting necessarily abusive? It is less important to answer these and related
questions (such as those concerning the political implications of the allocation
of authority within the family) than to recognize that their resolution affects the
independence and stability of the nuclear family. 157 The imposition of
conventional expectations may undermine trust and intimacy in families that
are merely unconventional. We want to protect norms that stretch beyond the
conventional. We should be cautious about uncritically endorsing motives to
151. See James P. Comer, Educational Accountability: A Shared Responsibility Between
Parents and Schools, 4 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 113 (1993) (pointing out that parents must be
more involved in order for schools to effectively educate children).
152. Id. (explaining the importance of a parent’s influence on a child, stating that “[p]arents
bring to the educational experience valuable knowledge and perspectives . . . .”).
153. NICK STEVENSON, UNDERSTANDING MEDIA CULTURES: SOCIAL THEORY AND MASS
COMMUNICATION (2002).
154. Reva B. Siegel, “The Rule of Love”: Wife Beating as Prerogative and Privacy, 105
YALE L.J. 2117, 2118 (1996).
155. Id.
156. See generally EVE S. BUZAWA & CARL G. BUZAWA, DOMESTIC VIOLENCE: THE
CRIMINAL JUSTICE RESPONSE (1990).
157. See generally DEAN TONG, ASHES TO ASHES. . .FAMILIES TO DUST: FALSE
ACCUSATIONS OF CHILD ABUSE (1997) (discussing the implications of accusations of child abuse
on the family unit).
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peer within the family in search of aberrations. If we want families to serve as
asylums and incubators in which children become adults under the guidance
and care of their parents, we should preserve norms of non-intervention.
Finally, it is worth noting that Americans do not enlist in community
organizations, which can function as family amplifiers and surrogates, as they
historically did. 158 DeToqueville remarked about his journeys among us in the
early 19th century that we were consummate joiners, that civil society
flourished among the several states he visited because Americans flocked to
civic, religious, and other organizations that both provided useful services to
the community and reinforced shared values and social bonds among their
members. 159 As has been noted, Americans now “bowl alone.” 160 We do not
join leagues with others but instead pursue our individual interests by
ourselves. 161 The widely shared penchant for computer games and other
individualized interactions with computer technologies exacerbate the
problem. 162 This preference for solo activities is not reducible to increased
individualism with each person pursuing a uniquely differentiated life. 163
Indeed, we are often doing the same things as our neighbors. 164 Our “social
capital” has plummeted because we now do by ourselves what we used to do
together. 165 The theme deserves more attention than is appropriate here, but it
is another instance of a contraction of intimacy, in this case a reduced number
of people with whom one shares experiences and thereby reveals oneself to
another and receives the revelations of another.
C. Solitude
If we are not comforted by regular contact with our extended family or are
estranged from our fellow citizens, perhaps we are compensated with ample
peaceful seclusion as partial consolation. What we lose in relations that instill
traditional family and community values within us, perhaps we gain in an
independent subscription to values and activities that better suit our personal
preferences, unhindered by family or social group pressures. Unfortunately, it
has not worked out that way. We have not created private enclaves within

158. ROBERT D. PUTNAM, BOWLING ALONE: THE COLLAPSE AND REVIVAL OF AMERICAN
COMMUNITY 43-45 (Simon & Schuster 2000).
159. ALEXIS DETOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 595 (2004).
160. See generally PUTNAM, supra note 158.
161. Id. at 15.
162. HOWARD RHEINGOLD, THE VIRTUAL COMMUNITY: HOMESTEADING ON THE
ELECTRONIC FRONTIER 1-2 (1993).
163. JOSEPH TUROW, BREAKING UP AMERICA: ADVERTISING AND THE NEW MEDIA WORLD
1 (1997).
164. JOHN MCKNIGHT, THE CARELESS SOCIETY: COMMUNITY AND ITS COUNTERFEITS 154
(1995).
165. See PUTNAM, supra note 158, at 43.
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which to examine the foundations of our personal identities in order to create
ourselves afresh. We have not heeded Rilke’s advice to “[g]o into
yourself.” 166 Rather, we attend to the images and messages of the mass media
that largely drive us to consume. 167 We are creatures of the market economy,
buying through boom and bust, adorning ourselves with material goods that
promise to salve our spirits. 168 We have mistaken lock-step movement through
advertising’s crafted ruts as personal progress. 169 We are bombarded with
pleas for our attention, from spam that congeals our web servers to
telemarketers whose relentlessness prompts us to assume that incoming phone
calls are unwanted. The media that we hoped would open new worlds have
been co-opted so that we are preoccupied with defending ourselves against
them. 170 The acceleration in media saturation has affected our physiology. It
appears that the neural networks of children are different than their parents. 171
In striking contrast to their parents, children’s brains are hardwired to multitask and seamlessly interact with their multiple computers. 172 These youth
may need a steady diet of electronic stimuli to satisfy their hyped-up neural
networks.
The unrelenting yammering of marketing techniques affects our selfconception and our most intimate desires. Spam and telephone solicitations
are mechanisms in a larger consumerism that encourages us to view ourselves
as the sum of what we own. We express ourselves in the accumulation of
mass-produced things. The global complaint lodges against a market economy
that impels us to consume and a mass media that maneuvers our tastes and
preferences. They both aim to squeeze contrary models from the realm of
reasonable alternatives where one abstains from a cultivated compulsion to
consume. The particular complaint is that it is extremely difficult to escape the
insinuation of mass marketing mechanisms. The phones ring, the mailbox
fills, the email account overflows, the television rants, and, consequently, our
brain is cluttered with a behavioral model that fills all the available space. It is
166. RAINER MARIA RILKE, LETTERS TO A YOUNG POET 64 (2000),
167. See generally JAMES J. FERRELL, ONE NATION UNDER GOODS: MALLS AND THE
SEDUCTION OF AMERICAN SHOPPING (2003).
168. See generally JEREMY RIFKIN, THE AGE OF ACCESS 4 (2000).
169. MICHAEL SCHUDSON, ADVERTISING, THE UNEASY PERSUASION: ITS DUBIOUS IMPACT
ON AMERICAN SOCIETY 11 (1984).
170. ANN CAVOUKIAN & DON TAPSCOTT, WHO KNOWS: SAFEGUARDING YOUR PRIVACY IN
A NETWORKED WORLD 3 (1997).
171. See National Institute on Media and the Family, Television’s Effect on Reading and
Academic Achievement, http://www.mediafamily.org/facts/fact_tveffect_print.shtml (last visited
Feb. 16, 2006) (explaining how media saturation negatively affects the development of childrens’
brains because children between the ages of 3 and 5, unlike their parents, are at a “critical stage in
brain development” and “heavy television viewing can influence the development of brain neural
networks”).
172. See generally id.
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difficult to secure solitude when we carry the jingles of commerce deeply
internalized within our consciousness. We are satiated with the message to the
degree that we cannot imagine a world, both as place and point of view,
without it.
Rilke said, “[e]verything is gestation and birthing.” 173 He was endorsing
the value of reflection upon the meaning of things that might span years and
even decades before its significance could be appreciated. It might require
calm consideration, sustained over a lengthy period of time, to produce an
important insight. Solitude operates like dreams in this respect: it is the
occasion for our brain to sort through the vagaries of everyday experience and
identify themes and recognize meaning. Many of us cannot function without
dreams. 174 Consistently repressed REM sleep can lead to temporary
psychosis. 175 The argument here is that we do not function well without
periodic solitude and that we are systematically shrinking our capacity for
solitude.
D. Reserve
It is not clear where the boundaries for our personal space, both physical
and psychological, are anymore. Reality shows, such as Jerry Springer,
indicate a weakening of the instinct to preserve a private life, removed from
the criticisms of those without knowledge of the broader, subtler context of
that life. Cell phone use, for example, is demonstrably without boundaries. If
we want to be available all the time (which we apparently do), then we take
calls whenever they come, wherever we are. The content of most of these
conversations seems mundane, its banality outweighing the time and energy
expended. Indeed, most conversations seem more about social reassurance or
expressions of tribal hierarchy than the conveyance of useful information,
something like lesser primates picking lice off each other as a gesture of
rapport. However, content does periodically surface from the cell phone din
and no subject is inappropriate. The new convention for the practice allows
the cell phone user to conduct himself as though he were isolated from others.
He pretends that others do not hear his cell phone conversations, but, of course,
they do. Others pretend they have not heard the conversation, but, of course,
they have.

173. Reliquaries for our Sacred Feminine, http://www.mayatekinc.com/gueswel/
sculpture/reliq_about.html (last visited Feb. 15, 2006) (attributing the quote “[e]verything is
gestation and birthing” to Rainer Maria Rilke, in his book LETTERS TO A YOUNG POET).
174. See Dream-Theories and the Function of the Dream, http://www.psywww.com/
books/interp/chap01g.htm (last visited Feb. 16, 2005) (explaining the essential function of
dreams).
175. See generally ALLAN MOFFITT ET AL., THE FUNCTION OF DREAMING 273 (1993).
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Parents now can, and do, monitor the activities of their children and their
children’s babysitters with very small video cameras. 176 Parents are otherwise
permitted to observe their children, but the babysitter does not expect to be
recorded. This practice has implications for solitude and intimacy, but it also
raises reserve concerns. Whatever respect we normally accord one another, to
the effect that we accept each other at face value unless and until we have
reason to do otherwise, the videotaping of babysitters is an example of how we
are stretching exceptions to the norms of polite indifference.
Parents, of course, have a right to protect their children, 177 but we all have
rights that can be impinged by others. We radically alter the terms of our
normal interactions with others if we insist upon a right to videotape these
interactions. What is especially interesting is that many who opt to videotape
such transactions seem blind to the grounds for the objection, as though it
merely expressed a peculiar idiosyncrasy. 178 We do not stare at each other
because that conduct would violate prevailing norms of civility and reserve,
but if we can use a video camera to stare for us, at least some people are
persuaded that the norm has not been violated.
The key may be that technology transforms the norm because it abruptly
reconfigures its shape and texture. It is likely easier to act remotely than
directly in many contexts and so what might feel objectionable in person feels
unobjectionable from afar. To the extent that some norms of reserve are built
upon widely shared instincts, when the instinct is attenuated with a
technological intermediary, the norms may weaken as the technology becomes
widespread. Reserve may be particularly susceptible to the effects of
mediating technology because its norms can be somewhat vague and depend
upon widely shared intuitions. If technology weakens those intuitions, then the
norm may lose its force. The polite indifference that facilitates the interaction
of many people in close places may be retooled in significant ways to
accumulate new intuitions.
Government, too, is constricting reserve’s boundaries. The right to remain
silent is engraved in our Constitution as a bold empowerment of the individual
to resist the coercive force of government. 179 It is not phrased to enable
efficient law enforcement, but rather to recognize the special status of the
person and appropriate privileges that should support that status. 180 It would
176. Sue Shellenberger, Yes, It’s Okay to Spy on Your Babysitter: The Do’s and Don’ts of the
Nannycam, WALL ST. J., May 8, 2003, at D1.
177. APA Congressional Testimony on Media Violence and Children, May 20, 2004,
http://www.apa.org/ppo/issues/mediavioltest504.htm (last visited October 27, 2005).
178. Trine Fotel & Thyra Uth Thomsen, The Surveillance of Children’s Mobility, 1(4)
SURVEILLANCE AND SOC’Y 535 (2003), available at http://www.why-war.com/resources/files/
children.pdf.
179. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 498 (1966).
180. Id. at 491.
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appear that at least some of us are willing to reduce significantly the force of
the right, at least in exigent circumstances. An omen of the direct attack on the
right to remain silent arose in the context of drinking and driving
investigations. 181 Driving has been determined to be a privilege allowed to
citizens by the state and conditions can be imposed upon that privilege. 182
Thus, a license to drive can be revoked for failure to submit to a breathalyzer
test or to perform field sobriety tests. 183 In effect, testing is compelled for the
accused because road safety has been judged to outweigh the right of the driver
to not cooperate in providing evidence of his guilt. There is widespread
agreement that drunk driving offenses present a substantial hazard to the safety
of others. That agreement has been steadfastly managed by special interest
groups, particularly Mothers Against Drunk Driving (MADD), to make DUI a
crime punishable by jail terms and conditions of probation comparable to
serious felonies, like burglary and forgery. 184 A consequence of the agreement
is a diminishment of the right of the accused to remain silent when facing
arrest and trial.
There is a more recent diminishment that is more alarming. The federal
government relies upon the War on Terror to justify various law enforcement
activities, which strain the traditional interpretation of protections provided by
the Constitution to those accused of committing a crime. 185 Most of the
activities focus on individuals apprehended on foreign soil and charged with
waging war against the United States. Enemy combatants properly belong to a
different category than United States citizens who have violated the law. The
rub is that some United States citizens charged with crimes that occurred in the
United States are being prosecuted as though they were enemy combatants

181. See MICHAEL D. LAURENCE, ET AL., SOCIAL CONTROL OF THE DRINKING DRIVER 164
(1988).
182. See, e.g., State v. Uskea, 709 N.E.2d 1200, 1204 (Ohio 1999).
183. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 28-1321(D) (2005), N.J. Stat. Ann. § 39:4-50.4a(a)
(West 2005), OREGON REV. STAT. § 813.100(3) (2003).
184. MADD is a “non-profit grass roots organization” with a mission to “stop drunk driving,
support the victims of this violent crime and prevent underage drinking.”
MADD,
http://www.madd.org/aboutus/1094 (last visited February 16, 2006). For a list of MADD’s
official position statements, see Official Position Statements, http://www.madd.org/
aboutus/10518 (last visited February 16, 2006). Though the statutory maximum penalties for
serious felonies exceed those for DUI offenses, the pressures of a tightly focused public scrutiny
affects the sentences actually imposed. Thus, a second offender burglar might be treated leniently
and escape detention because he was being treated for the drug problem that underlie his
burgling. A second offender DUI would almost certainly get some jail time. Indeed, it is often
statutorily mandated. For examples of common state statutes criminalizing the offense of driving
while intoxicated, see ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 28- 1381 (2005), DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 21, § 4177
(2005), and N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 265:8 (2005).
185. See JAMES X. DEMPSEY & DAVID COLE, TERRORISM AND THE CONSTITUTION 152
(2002).
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seized abroad. 186 The melding of categories is important because enemy
combatants held at Guantanamo Bay may be subject to functional Magnetic
Resonance Imaging (“fMRI”), which are physical examinations that purport to
provide foolproof evidence about the examinee relevant to whether they did
the deeds for which they are charged. 187
An fMRI is a brain fingerprint that can “detect brain activity that is
associated with particular kinds of recollection.” 188 A suspect can be shown an
image, such as a crime scene or a terrorist training camp, and the devise will
detect whether he recognizes the image, or if he has been in that location
before. 189 This is an extremely powerful truth and lie detector device that does
not require that the examinee answer questions. The cooperation required
from the examinee is minimal. However, it seems clear that the use of fMRI is
an invasion of the privileged mental life of the examinee. It is also clear that
the technology is very effective and that its effectiveness will argue for its
selective use in important cases. Of course, the boundaries of selective use
may be difficult to firmly demarcate.
Arguments for the use of torture in exceptional cases, such as when a
madman knows where a dirty bomb that will kill hundreds of thousands of
innocents is located, are standard fare for utilitarian calculations of correct
conduct. These thought experiments drive us to accept that torture is
acceptable at some extreme tradeoff in what it accomplishes and then, having
stepped onto the slippery slope, ratchets back from the tipping instance to less
obvious cases. It is likely that fMRI will follow that precedent. We know
already that the relaxed standards for criminal procedures that were passed into
law in order to more effectively pursue international terrorism, such as the U.S.
PATRIOT Act, 190 are being used in domestic investigations. 191 If fMRI is
appropriate to address the threat of foreign terrorism, why should we resist its
use with domestic terrorists or individuals suspected of heinous crimes? It is
doubtful that the right to remain silent will survive uncompromised if the
government can impose fMRI examinations in special circumstances. The

186. Jenny S. Martinez, José Padilla and the War on Rights, VA. Q. REV., available at
http://vqronline.org/viewmedia.php/prmMID/8959 (last visited October 26, 2005).
187. See, Matthew Teague, The End of the Lie, PHILADELPHIA MAG., Nov., 2005, available
at (LEXIS, News) (discussing the possibility of using fMRI technology in Guantanamo Bay).
188. Jeffrey Rosen, Supreme Futurology, TIMES, August 28, 2005, at 27.
189. Id.
190. Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to
Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (2001).
191. Larry Abramson, Patriot Act: Alleged Abuses of the Law, NAT’L PUB. RADIO, July 20,
2005, available at http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=4756403 (last visited
Feb. 16, 2006); Michelle Mittelstadt, Patriot Act’s Reach Goes Beyond Terror. Prosecutors
Using Law for Everyday Crimes; Critics Say It’s Intrusive,, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Sept. 8,
2003, available at http://foi.missouri.edu/usapatriotact/pareach.html (last visited Feb. 16, 2006).
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Constitution’s conception of the person and the privileges to which she is
entitled will be diminished pro rata as well.
E.

Privacy

Privacy provides us with the time and tools to sort through our experiences
and construct a coherent life’s narrative. We do not immediately know how to
evaluate our experiences, especially those that are unfamiliar to us. 192 Without
a sense of ourselves separate from the flow of events and people around us and
the prevailing evaluation of what they mean, we are inclined to adopt the
prevailing view as our own. 193 Privacy fuels the formation of a self that is
distinct from the rush of events and exchanges, which entices an unthinking
conformity. 194 We would otherwise lose a sense of ourselves as beings
choosing a life’s course in the constant immediacy of the present.
We are intrinsically social beings. 195 Aristotle nominated us political
beings, 196 which raises the ante somewhat to assert a need to interact with
others in order to govern ourselves. As a species, we cannot provide for
ourselves until many years after birth without the active assistance of others.
Beyond this physical dependence upon others for the necessaries of life, we are
also dependent upon others for the criteria with which we assess meaning in
our lives. 197 We are cultural beings and do not generate criteria de novo, but
depend upon inherited standards with which we measure ourselves or against
which we rebel. 198
It is not necessary to specify exactly how humans accommodate their
social natures to make the point that, inevitably, we make sense of our lives
while living in communites with others. Privacy is a fundamental prerequisite
for that search for meaning. 199 Various psychologists, philosophers, and
theologians address the particulars of the search and we need not quibble with
the contrasting emphases of the varying elaborations. 200 It is sufficient to
highlight some key features of that search to make it evident that the process of
personal growth depends upon privacy as a condition for its progress.

192. MICHAEL SHERMER, WHY PEOPLE BELIEVE WEIRD THINGS: PSEUDOSCIENCE,
SUPERSTITION, AND OTHER CONFUSIONS OF OUR TIME 7 (1997).
193. See generally CHRISTOPHER LASCH, THE MINIMAL SELF: PSYCHIC SURVIVAL IN
TROUBLED TIMES 52 (1984).
194. DECKLE MCCLEAN, PRIVACY AND ITS INVASION 71-72 (1995).
195. The Case of Joanne Harris, http://www.ualberta.ca/~jpdasddc/ethics/articles/
edwards1997.htm (last visited October 27, 2005).
196. ARISTOTLE, THE NICOMACHEAN ETHICS 1-2 (1998).
197. NORBERT ELIAS, THE CIVILIZING PROCESS: THE DEVELOPMENT OF MANNERS 5 (1978).
198. See generally CARL D. SCHNEIDER, SHAME, EXPOSURE, AND PRIVACY (2002).
199. See JUNE & WILLIAM NOBLE, THE PRIVATE ME 76 (1980) (“To develop a strong sense
of identity, of individual worth . . . [y]ou need private, unrushed space in which to work.”).
200. DONALD E. BROWN, HUMAN UNIVERSALS 92 (1991)
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The human species is remarkably malleable. 201 We acclimate to extreme
varieties of weather and geology throughout the world. We also accommodate
to widely varying social conditions. We have lived and prospered in small,
remote bands. We manage to build purposeful lives amid the tumult of large,
congested cities. We adapt to repressive, authoritarian regimes where thugs
rule arbitrarily, and we adjust to colonial rule where distant, unseen powers
dictate policy for people unlike themselves. In these often dysfunctional
circumstances, the human species manages to survive. The malleability is
sometimes frightening. We are capable of turning on our neighbors when our
own survival seems dependent upon that betrayal. The Milgram experiments
surprised even the test administrators by demonstrating a willingness to inflict
pain on innocent others, if the infliction was sanctioned by appropriately
attired and mannered authorities. 202
There are numerous instances where individuals have joined cults and
subjected themselves to the often bizarre or self-destructive mandates of the
cult. Cult leaders frequently pursue brainwashing techniques to persuade
neophyte members to take up the cult’s cause in earnest. 203 Whether structured
or haphazard, a consistent tactic in the reinforcement of the cult’s solidarity is
the elimination of privacy. 204 It is important to control the schedule of cult
members to reduce their opportunities to discuss the indoctrination
procedures. 205 Indeed, cults encourage their members to report on each
other. 206 There are no truly private conversations because everyone is charged
to report anything irregular to the cult leadership. 207
We are not inevitably independent thinkers. We are not teleologically
promised ever-increasing person freedoms. We possess qualities as a species
that strongly suggest a deeply rooted interest in, and perhaps a need for, selfexpression. We seem to prefer forms of government that cultivate a mutual
respect and support for self-expression, though this is a more speculative
claim. However, we should not presume that enhanced self-expression for
maximally many people is our ineluctable future. We have proven resilient
during our limited time on this planet, but part of that resilience is explained by
our ability to suffer through hardship and deprivation for long periods of time.
This includes centuries that were not conducive to personal freedom and self-

201. See generally DESMOND MORRIS, HUMAN ZOO: A ZOOLOGIST’S STUDY OF THE URBAN
ANIMAL (1969).
202. STANLEY MILGRAM, OBEDIENCE TO AUTHORITY: AN EXPERIMENTAL VIEW 13-14, 123
(1974).
203. Laura B. Brown, He Who Controls the Mind Controls the Body: False Imprisonment,
Religious Cults, and the Destruction of Volitional Capacity, 25 VAL. U. L. REV. 407, 412 (1991).
204. Id. at 450.
205. Susan Landra, Children and Cults: A Practical Guide, 29 J. FAM. LAW 595, 602 (1991).
206. Id.
207. Id.
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expression. The best means to promote a future that supports personal freedom
for maximally many people involves the protection of the conditions precedent
for a consciousness that strives for personal freedom and recognizes its value
for others. It is only by enabling the development of persons who can reflect
upon the meaning of their lives and associate with others to advance that
understanding and support its expression that a program to promote personal
freedom makes sense. It is not sufficient to remove obstacles and shout
encouragement to credibly make a claim that personal freedoms flourish.
Individuals, not external constraints or the lack thereof, are the loci of personal
freedom. Unless individuals have the resources and the motivation to express
their freedoms, those freedoms exist only as abstract entities. Without a sense
of self and judgment about what matters to that self, there is no substance to a
roster of personal freedoms.
We are simultaneously resilient and fragile. For all that science tells us, it
cannot tell us the meaning of our lives. That question is beyond its ken. We
are charged with identifying meaning for ourselves, however tenuous and
fleeting our conclusions may be. However difficult the search and however
elusive the answer, it is a responsibility charged to each of us individually to
undertake the search. We conduct the search among others and we rely on
their guidance and encouragement to persist in this venture. Each of us has
direct access to only our own consciousness and each of us must secure a
unique reading of the meaning of our life. That reading is genuine only if it
results from a deliberation that feeds heavily on the resources of privacy.

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

62

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY PUBLIC LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 25:33

